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I. INTRODUCTION
Amortization of nonconforming uses is a powerful but oppressive
tool the government uses to remove properties that do not match the
vision of city planners without having to pay any compensation to the
property owner. Under this scheme, the government changes the zon-
ing in an area in which a legal, conforming business sits and makes
that business an illegal, nonconforming use. The government then
gives the business a certain time frame to ostensibly earn back, or
“amortize,” its investment in the property. At the end of this period,
the business owner must bring the property into compliance (even if it
is not suited for the new zoning rules) or cease operation—and the
government does not need to pay any compensation to the property
† William R. Maurer is the Managing Attorney of the Washington state office of
the Institute for Justice, a nationwide public interest law firm that litigates in the area
of private property rights. He is the lead attorney in a suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the city of Dallas’ attempt to retroactively zone Hinga’s Automotive, Inc.
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owner. Cities across the country and in Texas have used amortization
as slow-motion eminent domain without any compensation, often to
force a transfer of the property to more attractive private owners.
Nonetheless, the courts have largely found amortization laws to be
constitutional; although, a small number of courts have struck them
down as takings without just compensation and a violation of due
process.
Amortization is, at its core, retroactive legislation. Using amortiza-
tion, cities take legal, preexisting uses and apply new restrictions that
make the uses illegal. Amortization disrupts settled business expecta-
tions and, often times, destroys businesses and livelihoods, all because
a city planner has determined—after the fact—that the property
owner who is already there does not fit into the new zoning scheme
for the area. The retroactive nature of amortization should make the
system illegal in Texas. Most challenges to amortization, however, at-
tempt to classify the use of the concept as an uncompensated taking.
Although amortization does constitute an uncompensated taking, the
more direct constitutional flaw in amortization is its retroactivity, that
is, it unfairly changes the rules for property owners and imposes disa-
bilities well after the fact.
Two developments in case law open up avenues of attack against
amortization in Texas, but property owners in Texas have failed to use
these arguments in challenges to the amortization of their property.
First, the Texas Supreme Court has recently revitalized the Texas Con-
stitution’s prohibition on retroactive civil legislation.1 Applying the
court’s standards for unconstitutional retroactive legislation will
render the use of amortization unconstitutional, except in the most
extreme circumstances. Second, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,2 Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurrence laid out a path for challenging retroactive
laws as violating due process,3 an approach shared by four other mem-
bers of the Supreme Court and subsequently adopted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit.4 Applying Justice Kennedy’s approach will likely preclude a
municipality’s use of amortization to disrupt settled expectations.
This Article discusses what amortization is, why municipal govern-
ments use it, and how the courts of Texas and other states have
treated the practice. Next, this Article argues that, while Texas courts
have routinely approved amortization, many exercises of the power
are likely unconstitutional under Texas’s prohibition on retroactive
civil legislation and that it violates due process. Lastly, this Article
1. See generally Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex.
2010).
2. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
3. Id. at 547–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 553–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McK-
eithen, 226 F.3d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 2000).
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concludes with a call for Texas courts to reexamine the constitutional-
ity of this oppressive practice and do away with it once and for all.
II. WHAT IS AMORTIZATION?
Amortization is a tool used by planners to eliminate nonconforming
uses within a zoning district. A “nonconforming use” is a “building,
structure or use of land that is in existence and lawful on the date
when a zoning ordinance or amendment becomes effective prohibiting
such use, but which, nevertheless, continues unaffected by such an or-
dinance or amendment thereto.”5 The general theory among planners
is that “nonconforming uses are injurious to a zoning scheme and
should be eliminated as soon as is consistent with due process of
law.”6 Indeed, many planners see “the fundamental problem facing
zoning [as] the inability to eliminate the non-conforming use.”7
In the past, municipalities typically allowed nonconforming uses “to
continue for two basic reasons: (1) [b]ecause it was felt that zoning
laws could not constitutionally be applied retroactively to deprive the
owner of his nonconforming use, and (2) because zoning looks prima-
rily to the future and seeks to stabilize, and protect and not to de-
stroy.”8 Many planners assumed that because the government
discouraged their existence, nonconforming uses would eventually dis-
appear. However, the consensus among planners now is that “[t]here
is little indication . . . that non-conforming uses ever do disappear. The
favorable, sometimes monopolistic, position accorded them, together
with municipal requirements that all buildings meet certain standards
of fitness, militates against their elimination.”9 In response to this per-
5. Joseph A. Katarincic, Elimination of Non-Conforming Uses, Buildings, and
Structures by Amortization—Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQ. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963).
6. 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.69, at
695 (4th ed. 1996).
7. Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9
U. CHI. L. REV. 477, 479 (1942).
8. Samuel B. Hickman, Note, Zoning: Elimination of Nonconforming Use by
“Amortization”: Constitutionality of Municipal Ordinance: Harbison v. City of Buf-
falo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958), 44 CORNELL L. Q. 450,
451–52 (1959) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted); This is a broadly
accepted concept, but there is usually little analysis to back up this conclusion. At
least one pro-regulation academic has challenged the basis for this conclusion. See
Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1222, 1224 (2009) (“The legal literature has largely assumed that existing uses
are entitled to protection and has almost wholly failed to examine the basis for that
assumption.”).
9. Note, supra note 7, at 479; see also Hickman, supra note 8, at 452 (“In the early
stages of zoning, it was believed that prior nonconforming uses would eventually elim-
inate themselves over a period of years through abandonment, destruction and other
normal changes. Contrary to these expectations, nonconforming uses still abound.”);
This is a broadly accepted view as well, but there is no evidence that this is actually
true, especially now that zoning has been in place for many decades in practically
every American municipality. Even when zoning was in its toddler years, one pro-
zoning author had to admit that “there is little statistical data available” to suggest
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ceived problem and the inability of the government to immediately
terminate nonconforming uses, municipalities devised various meth-
ods for terminating such uses.
The first, and “most obvious,” method is eminent domain.10 How-
ever, municipalities do not find this as an attractive alternative be-
cause of the cost.11 Moreover, there has been some hesitancy among
municipal governments to employ eminent domain because they fear
courts would not consider the termination of a harmless, nonconform-
ing use to be a public purpose.12
A second method for terminating nonconforming uses is abandon-
ment—if the owner discontinued the nonconforming use, the govern-
ment would consider this to be a permanent forfeiture.13 This method
requires the property owner to actually discontinue the nonconform-
ing use, meaning that the planners do not decide when the noncon-
forming use ends. Planners, as the name suggests, want to plan and do
not like to wait for a property owner to abandon a nonconforming
use.
A third method is for the government to limit extensions or repairs
of the property.14 In addition to raising issues under state and federal
prohibitions on uncompensated takings, this method actually forces
property owners to let their property deteriorate, raising both aes-
thetic and safety concerns.
The fourth, and overwhelmingly popular, method is amortization.
The basic idea behind amortization “is to determine the remaining
normal useful life of a pre-existing use. The owner is then allowed to
continue his use for this period and at the end must either conform or
eliminate it.”15 “These laws are based on the principle that the prop-
erty owner should be given time to recoup his investment in land
before being forced to discontinue the use without compensation.”16
The idea is that the government chooses a time period in which the
that nonconforming uses benefitted from monopoly status and that determining
whether this is in fact true is “almost impossible.” See Note, supra note 7, at 479 &
n.11.
10. See Note, supra note 7, at 480.
11. Katarincic, supra note 5, at 5.
12. Id.; see also YOUNG, supra note 6, § 6.77 at 722 (noting negative comments
regarding an effort in Minnesota to use condemnation as a tool for zoning); In
Berman v. Parker, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the District of Columbia’s blight
statute that permitted the District to condemn private property and transfer it to an-
other private entity in order to eliminate “blighted areas.” 348 U.S. 26, 28–29, 33
(1954). This statute was premised on an assumption that the removal of blight would
be accomplished by “the sound replanning and redevelopment of an obsolescent or
obsolescing portion” of the District. Id. at 29. This suggests that the District wanted to
do away with nonconforming uses.
13. Katarincic, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Id.
15. Hickman, supra note 8, at 453.
16. PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC D. KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS,
Ch. 41, Nonconforming Uses, § 41.04[1] (LexisNexis, Matthew Bender 2015).
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owner of the nonconforming use should be able to earn enough
money to cover the cost of the nonconforming use. Once this time
period has concluded, the owner must terminate the use. Because the
owner is presumed to have recovered his or her investment in the
property during the amortization period, the government does not
have to pay just compensation (or any compensation) to the owner.
“These time periods range from a few months or years (as in the case
of billboards) up to fifty or sixty years (for very substantial
structures).”17
New Orleans enacted the first amortization law in the United States
in 1929 and the idea slowly spread across the country.18 Amortization
laws can vary in scope. Some states and municipalities only apply
amortization to aesthetically displeasing uses like billboards and junk-
yards.19 Government planners also use amortization to target vice-re-
lated industries, such as strip clubs, adult bookstores, and saloons,
where the use of more heavy-handed tools could raise First Amend-
ment problems and generate litigation.20 Still other government enti-
ties apply amortization to every kind of use, including apartment
buildings and private homes.21
III. AMORTIZATION IN THE COURTS
Below, the Author discusses how courts have treated constitutional
challenges to amortization laws. It should be noted that, in addition to
constitutional challenges, property owners often claim that amortiza-
tion is ultra vires.22 Ultra vires claims are entirely statutory and depend
on the nature of the authority granted from the state legislature to
municipal governments in a particular state. While these types of chal-
lenges are an important tool against municipal efforts to use amortiza-
tion, this Article will focus entirely on constitutional challenges.
A. In General
“The technique of terminating nonconforming uses through amorti-
zation has been approved by a majority of courts in the United
States,”23 although, this view is not universal and the courts that have
approved of the practice have often done so over vigorous dissents.
The willingness of some courts to uphold amortization often stems
from the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld prospective zoning
17. Id. § 41.04[2].
18. Note, supra note 7, at 480 & n.21.
19. Id. at 481.
20. See generally Mark McPherson, Advanced Zoning: Cleaning up the SOB’s in
Dallas, MCPHERSON L. FIRM, PC (May 28, 2014), http://texasenvironmentallaw.com/
enviropinions/category/zoning-2.
21. Note, supra note 7, at 481.
22. Id. at 483.
23. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.04[3].
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in the 1926 Euclid case notwithstanding a number of arguments
against amortization.24 This willingness persists despite the fact that
prospective zoning and amortization operate on two different sets of
expectations and rights. For instance, in Euclid, the Court rejected the
argument that prospective zoning was unconstitutional because it
caused financial harm to property owners. Instead the Court held that
the ordinance will be upheld so long as it does not “pass[ ] the bounds
of reason.”25 Thus, under Euclid, “the loss [to the property owner]
must be borne without compensation when there is a reasonable rela-
tionship between the purpose of the zoning regulations and the public
welfare.”26 But the nature of zoning’s effects on preexisting rights was
never discussed.
In any event, governments have relied on Euclid to argue that zon-
ing regulations are acceptable both prospectively and as applied to
existing uses. As one commenter put it, “The distinction between ordi-
nances restricting future uses and those requiring the termination of
present uses is merely one of degree, and constitutionality depends
upon the relative importance to be given to the public gain and to the
private loss.”27
This was the conclusion reached by the California Court of Appeal
in the leading case of City of Los Angeles v. Gage.28 The court began
its analysis of Los Angeles’s amortization ordinance by noting that
zoning laws are an exercise of the police power.29 As such, they are
presumptively valid and the challenger bears the burden of demon-
strating unconstitutionality.30 The court declared that it would strike
down such laws “only where no reason exists to support the determi-
nation of the legislative body” and where the legislative decision is
“clearly and palpably wrong.”31 The court held the fact that a person
was operating a business that was perfectly legal when it began “does
not give the owner thereof a vested right to have the exception contin-
ued so as to entitle him, on that ground, to attack the validity of a later
ordinance repealing the former.”32 “The mere fact that some hardship
is experienced” in the termination of the nonconforming use “is not
material” because “[e]very exercise of the police power is apt to affect
adversely the property interest of somebody.”33 Thus, the court held,
24. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388–89 (1926).
25. Id. at 389 (quotation marks omitted).
26. Note, supra note 7, at 483.
27. Id. at 485.
28. 274 P.2d 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
29. Id. at 38.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 39 (quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 40 (quotation marks omitted).
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“[d]amage caused by the proper exercise of the police power is merely
one of the prices an individual must pay as a member of society.”34
Turning to the method by which Los Angeles chose to terminate the
preexisting use at issue, the court concluded that amortization was a
constitutional means to achieve this end. The court held that “[i]f the
amortization period is reasonable the loss to the owner may be small
when compared with the benefit to the public.”35 Thus, the court con-
cluded, “[t]he elimination of existing uses within a reasonable time
does not amount to a taking of property nor does it necessarily restrict
the use of property so that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose.”36
The California court thus concluded that amortization was constitu-
tional and that it would uphold a particular application of amortiza-
tion if the time period was reasonable. The state courts in many states
have followed this line of reasoning, including, among others, New
York, Maryland, Delaware, Washington, Indiana, and North Carolina,
and, as discussed below, this is currently the prevailing view in Texas.
In these states, and others that follow the Gage reasoning, the consti-
tutional issue is not whether amortization is permitted, but whether
the government is implementing it correctly.
However, California’s approach is not unanimous. The Missouri Su-
preme Court wrote the leading case among the minority of states that
have found amortization to be unconstitutional.37 While acknowledg-
ing the success of “zoning zealots” in their crusade to remove noncon-
forming uses, the court nonetheless specifically declined to follow
Gage and other cases upholding amortization.
[A]lthough the holdings in other jurisdictions may, in some in-
stances, be enlightening and persuasive, it is neither our duty nor
our inclination to rule a question of first impression in this state
simply by counting foreign cases and then falling off the judicial
fence on the side on which more cases can be found.  Rather, our
concern should be and is to determine the basic constitutional right
of the matter, as we see it.38
The court rejected the argument that because zoning harms prop-
erty owners in the future, the government has the ability to harm
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. This conclusion badly misunderstands the purpose of the Takings Clause.
The court seemed to conclude, without stating as much, that the provision of a reason-
able amortization satisfied the Takings Clause. But government takings are supposed
to result in the government compensating property owners, not property owners com-
pensating themselves, regardless of how long an amortization period went on for. The
Author is aware of no other area of Takings jurisprudence where a court has con-
cluded that compensation need not come from the government in order to satisfy the
Takings Clause.
37. See Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965) (en banc).
38. Id. at 752.
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property owners now: “[W]e cannot embrace the doctrine . . . that
there is no material distinction between regulating the future use of
property and terminating pre-existing lawful nonconforming use.”39
Because the Constitution did not permit the government to immedi-
ately terminate a nonconforming use, that action did not become ac-
ceptable by the passage of time. “[I]t would be a strange and novel
doctrine indeed which would approve a municipality taking private
property for public use without compensation if the property was not
too valuable and the taking was not too soon . . . .”40 The court then
concluded that St. Louis’s amortization ordinance constituted a taking
without compensation in violation of Article I, section 26 of the Mis-
souri Constitution.41
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed Missouri’s Hoffman and
similarly found that an amortization ordinance violated Penn-
sylvania’s takings clause in PA Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zon-
ing Hearing Board of Township of Moon.42 Noting that the
Pennsylvania Constitution “protects the right of a property owner to
use his or her property in any lawful way that he or she so chooses,”
the court concluded that “[i]f government desires to interfere with the
owner’s use, where the use is lawful and is not a nuisance nor is it
abandoned, it must compensate the owner for the resulting loss.”43
Thus, the court held “that the amortization and discontinuance of a
lawful pre-existing nonconforming use is per se confiscatory and viola-
tive of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”44
The Indiana Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in Ailes v.
Decatur County Area Planning Commission.45 There, the court con-
cluded “that an ordinance prohibiting any continuation of an existing
lawful use within a zoned area regardless of the length of time given to
amortize that use is unconstitutional as the taking of property without
due process of law and an unreasonable exercise of the police
power.”46 However, the same court later reversed this decision (at
least with regard to the constitutionality of amortization under the
U.S. Constitution).47
Hoffman, Northwest Distributors, and Ailes are the only cases that
have struck down amortization ordinances as per se unconstitutional;
although, most cases upholding amortization laws feature vigorous
dissents. The Pennsylvania and Missouri decisions both rested on in-
39. Id. at 753.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 754–55.
42. 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991).
43. Id. at 1376.
44. Id.
45. 448 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. 1983), overruled by Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702
N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1998).
46. Id. at 1060.
47. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. 1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-2\TWR102.txt unknown Seq: 9 10-NOV-17 15:14
2017] AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS GONE 153
terpretations of state constitutions. In that regard, the U.S. Supreme
Court has never considered the validity of an amortization provision,
and there are relatively few federal appellate court decisions consider-
ing the issue. When the federal courts have considered amortization,
they have applied Gage or reasoning very similar to the reasoning in
Gage.48
B. The Texas Courts’ Treatment of Amortization
At one point, the Texas Supreme Court was full throated in its de-
fense of private property.49 Those days soon came to an end.
The Texas Legislature, through the local government code, has
granted municipalities general zoning powers for an amalgamation of
purposes.50 In City of University Park v. Benners,51 the Texas Supreme
Court held that zoning ordinances requiring the termination of non-
conforming uses passed pursuant to such zoning powers are generally
within the scope of a municipality’s police power and do not effectu-
ate a taking.52 Since Benners, appellate courts throughout Texas have
upheld various forms of amortization as a valid technique of allowing
property owners to recoup their investment in property that became
nonconforming as a result of a city’s exercise of its police powers.53
48. See, e.g., World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186,
1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2004); Art Neon Co. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 121
(10th Cir. 1973); Recently, one academic commentator has suggested that the cases
upholding amortization provisions do not go far enough and that immediate termina-
tion of nonconforming uses is both constitutional and desirable. See Serkin, supra
note 8, at 1249. This commentator bases his argument on a belief that the assumptions
underlying amortization are incorrect and that the correct test to apply to amortiza-
tion is not the Euclid “reasonableness” test, but the Supreme Court’s regulatory tak-
ings analysis from Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978). Id. at 1249–56. This author also argues that the courts employ the test
from Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), to determine whether imme-
diate termination violates due process. Id. at 1260–61. Under both tests, he concludes
that the government may constitutionally order an otherwise harmless use to immedi-
ately cease operation and, in doing so, the government need not compensate the
property owner. Id. at 1260.
49. See Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (Tex. 1921) (“[The right to own
property] is not a right . . . over which the police power is paramount. Like every
other fundamental liberty, it is a right to which the police power is subordinate.”).
50. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 211.001 (West 2015) (granting powers for
purposes of “promoting public health, safety, morals, or general welfare and protect-
ing and preserving places and areas of historical, cultural, or architectural
importance”).
51. 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972).
52. See id. at 779.
53. See, e.g., Bd. of Adjustment v. Patel, 887 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1994, writ denied) (holding that the period of amortization should be determined by
the amount of investment at the time that the motel became nonconforming); Bd. of
Adjustment v. Winkles, 832 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied)
(holding that an increase in inventory after the business became nonconforming does
not increase the period of amortization); Bd. of Adjustment v. Winkles, 832 S.W.2d
803, 806 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (holding that an increase in inventory
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These cases uniformly relied on Benners in assuming the constitu-
tionality of reasonable uses of amortization.54 However, municipalities
do not have complete discretion with regards to amortization.55 The
Texas Supreme Court has warned that the line between police power
and takings is “illusory” and requires “a careful analysis of the facts
. . . in each case of this kind.”56 Thus, the prevailing analysis of amorti-
zation in Texas focuses on the reasonableness of any amortization pe-
riod—a fact-intensive, ad hoc inquiry.57 For example, in Benners, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the property owner must be “afforded
an opportunity to recover his investment in the structures theretofore
placed on the property.”58 In another case, a Texas appellate court
held that the reasonableness standard only requires a reasonable op-
portunity for owners to recover their actual investment in the noncon-
forming structure, rather than the market value of the structure.59
after the business became nonconforming does not increase the period of amortiza-
tion); Murmur Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 718 S.W.2d 790, 797–98 (Tex. App.—Dal-
las 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (defining “full value” for recoupment purposes as owner’s
actual investment in nonconforming use at the time of the zoning change); Lubbock
Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935, 945–46 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1978,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (accepting amortizing as a valid method for recouping investment).
54. See, e.g., Lubbock Poster Co., 569 S.W.2d at 938 (noting that the Texas Su-
preme Court, in Benners, joined the prevailing view of outside jurisdictions by recog-
nizing amortization as a valid exercise of the municipal police power to terminate
nonconforming property uses).
55. See, e.g., Murmur Corp., 718 S.W.2d at 801–02 (allowing property owner to
continue nonconforming use of land because the board’s order terminating such use
was not supported by evidence that the owner had recovered his investment in the
structure or value of use). It is unclear if amortization is constitutionally required in
Texas and no case law says it is. In other words, the requirement of amortization
seems to be more of a case of noblesse oblige than a constitutional requirement. In
fact, a federal court in Texas upheld zoning changes that immediately halted a busi-
ness’s operation. See generally Laredo Rd. Co. v. Maverick Cty., 389 F.Supp.2d 729,
739–40 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (upholding an ordinance that shut down a sexually oriented
business (“SOB”) that was 80% complete when the ordinance passed because “there
are . . . plenty of other areas for the Plaintiff to set up its business”); but see Ellwest
Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Byrd, 472 F.Supp. 702, 706–07 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (striking
down, on First Amendment grounds, an ordinance that caused a SOB to close
immediately).
56. City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 575 (Tex. 2012) (quoting City of
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984)).
57. See City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 780 (Tex. 1972). (“[T]he
validity of the exercise of the police power in effecting zoning changes is not mea-
sured by an arbitrary lapse of time but by the reasonableness of the enactment and
the fairness of its relationship to the objects sought to be attained.”).
58. Id. at 779.
59. Murmur Corp., 718 S.W.2d at 794; see also Lubbock Poster Co., 569 S.W.2d at
941–42 (listing the relevant criteria in determining reasonableness as the amount of
actual investment in the structure, investment realization as of the effective date of
the ordinance, the life expectancy of the investment, and the existence of lease
obligations).
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IV. NEW ROUTES TO CHALLENGE AMORTIZATION AS A
RETROACTIVE LAW
A. Traditional Means of Attacking Amortization
Property owners usually challenge amortization provisions as a reg-
ulatory taking or as an inverse condemnation. Under the current stan-
dard for a regulatory taking, “there must be a complete deprivation of
the owner’s economically viable use of the property.”60 This is a diffi-
cult standard for many property owners to meet, as a rezone of their
property will usually leave them with some, albeit paltry, economic
use.61 Likewise, an inverse condemnation claim is also a difficult claim
for property owners to bring. To succeed in an inverse condemnation
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) an intentional governmental
act; (2) that resulted in [plaintiff’s] property being taken, damaged, or
destroyed; (3) for public use.”62 Thus, to succeed, a plaintiff must
prove a regulatory taking first (to satisfy the second prong of the in-
verse condemnation test), and, as noted above, that is very difficult to
do.
Moreover, under Texas law, both claims are preempted by the gov-
ernment’s police power.63 For an exercise of the police power to be
valid and not a taking, it must be: “(1) adopted to accomplish a legiti-
mate goal and substantially related to public health, safety or general
welfare; and (2) reasonable and not arbitrary.”64 In Pharr, the court of
appeals held that “[c]onsiderations of aesthetics as well as surrounding
property values” are legitimate goals.65 In any event, dispelling any
doubt, in Benners, as discussed above, the Texas Supreme Court held
that amortization is a valid exercise of the police power.66
So are there other avenues in Texas law to challenge amortization?
The answer to that question is “yes,” but Texas property owners have
not taken advantage of them. Specifically, there are two avenues of
attack that focus entirely on the retroactive nature of amortization.
60. Matagorda Cty. v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 1994) (referencing
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 138, n.36 (1978)).
61. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (“Zoning laws
generally do not affect existing uses of real property, but ‘taking’ challenges have also
been held to be without merit in a wide variety of situations when the challenged
governmental actions prohibited a beneficial use to which individual parcels had pre-
viously been devoted and thus caused substantial individualized harm.”).
62. City of Houston v. Mack, 312 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston[1st Dist.]
2009, no pet.) (citing City of Dallas v. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2006, no pet.)).
63. City of Pharr v. Pena, 853 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no
pet.).
64. Id. (citing City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802,
804–05 (Tex. 1984)).
65. Id.
66. See City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972).
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B. Amortization is Unconstitutional Because it is Retroactive
What is a retroactive law? “A retroactive law literally means a law
that acts on things which are past.”67 A law is retroactive when a legis-
lative body adopts a new substantive rule that alters the legal conse-
quences of actions taken under a previously valid legal regime.68
“[E]very statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations
already passed is a retrospective statute.”69 In determining whether a
law is retrospective, “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.”70
Amortization certainly is retroactive—it takes a preexisting, legal
use and converts it to a non-conforming, illegal use. It fundamentally
changes the way a piece of property may be used, regardless of how
long that property has been devoted to that use. Indeed, there are
likely few kinds of legislation that better fit the definition of a retroac-
tive law than ordinances creating an amortization period. This makes
amortization especially vulnerable to attack in Texas.
1. Amortization Violates the Anti-Retroactivity Provision of the
Texas Constitution
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Texas Constitution explicitly pro-
hibits retroactive civil laws. Specifically, Article 1, section 16 of the
Texas Constitution provides: “No . . . retroactive law . . . shall be
made.”71 Despite the clear language of the Constitution, however,
Texas courts do not invalidate all laws that operate retroactively. For
years, Texas courts applied conflicting, imprecise, and incomprehensi-
ble standards to the question of when a law was unconstitutionally
retroactive. In Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,72 the Texas Su-
preme Court essentially tore up decades of conflicting case law about
how to determine when a law is unconstitutionally retroactive and es-
tablished a new, three-factor test.73 This new, three-factor test could
have enormous implications for Texas property owners facing amorti-
zation of their property.
67. Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219
(Tex. 2002) (citing DeCordova v. City of Galveston, 4 Tex. 470, 475 (1849)).
68. Hyeongjoon David Choi, Robinson v. Crown: Formulation of a New Test for
Unconstitutional Retroactivity or Mere Restatement of Century-Old Texas Precedents?,
64 BAYLOR L. REV. 309, 312 (2012).
69. 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 735 (2016); A retroactive law is “one
which affects acts or rights accruing before it came into force.” Cardenas v. State, 683
S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ).
70. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994).
71. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
72. 335 S.W.3d 126, 145 (Tex. 2010).
73. Id. at 140–45.
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Robinson’s three factors are: (1) the nature and strength of the pub-
lic interest served by the statute as evidenced by the government’s
factual findings; (2) the nature of the prior right impaired by the stat-
ute; and (3) the extent of the impairment.74 The court further
explained:
The perceived public advantage of a retroactive law is not simply to
be balanced against its relatively small impact on private interests,
or the prohibition would be deprived of most of its force. There
must be a compelling public interest to overcome the heavy pre-
sumption against retroactive laws. To be sure, courts must be mind-
ful that statutes are not to be set aside lightly . . . . But courts must
also be careful to enforce the constitutional prohibition to safeguard
its objectives.75
Shockingly, no plaintiff has ever challenged amortization in Texas us-
ing Article I, section 16. Though, this is perhaps not so shocking when
one considers that, in the entire history of Texas prior to Robinson,
the Texas Supreme Court had struck down legislation as unconstitu-
tionally retroactive only three times.76 Nonetheless, there is a strong
argument that amortization of properties that are not dangerous, nui-
sances, or do not cause harmful secondary effects violates the prohibi-
tion on retrospective laws in Article I, section 16 of the Texas
Constitution. Applying the reinvigorated prohibition on retroactivity
to lawful, non-harmful properties would likely yield the following
results:
a. Nature and Strength of the Government Interest
The government will almost always be able to argue that it has legit-
imate interests in countering noise, traffic, crime, decreased property
values, and the ill effects of urbanization.77 But saying a governmental
interest is legitimate is not the same as saying that the interest is suffi-
cient to justify a retroactive law. Given the court’s strong presumption
against the validity of retroactive laws as demonstrated in Robinson,
and the court’s description of the standard for the government’s inter-
est as compelling, it is not likely that the court would find a city’s
generalized justifications sufficient to overcome the constitutional
prohibition. As the Robinson court explained, “an important reason
for the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws is to pre-
empt this weighing of interests absent compelling reasons. Indeed, it is
precisely because retroactive rectification of perceived injustice seems
74. Id. at 145.
75. Id. at 145–46. Those objectives are to protect people’s reasonable, settled ex-
pectations and to guard against abuses of governmental power. Id. at 145.
76. Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera, 445 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tex. 2014).
77. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 938–39 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1989, writ denied).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\4-2\TWR102.txt unknown Seq: 14 10-NOV-17 15:14
158 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 4
so reasonable and even necessary, especially when there are few to
complain, that the constitution prohibits it.”78
b. The Nature of the Right and the Extent of its Impairment
In Benners, the Texas Supreme Court held that “property owners
do not acquire a constitutionally protected vested right in property
uses once commenced or in zoning classifications once made.”79 How-
ever, this does not mean that a property owner has no vested rights in
his or her property. While one may not have a vested property right in
continuing a business, one has other valuable rights. In Texas, “[a]
person’s property interests include actual ownership of real estate,
chattels, and money. The term ‘property right’ refers to any type of
right to specific property, including tangible, personal property. A
right is ‘vested’ when it ‘has some definitive, rather than merely po-
tential existence.’”80 Moreover, “a statute harms vested property
rights if it completely shuts down an otherwise lawful business.”81
Thus, a business owner facing amortization certainly has a vested
property right in his or her real estate, chattels, and building. Moreo-
ver, many uses of amortization will result in forcing the property
owner to shut down an otherwise lawful business. Therefore, amorti-
zation ordinances likely harm vested property rights.
c. The Extent of the Impairment
Amortization often targets businesses that city planners believe are
unattractive and would purportedly interfere with development, such
as auto repair shops, scrap metal dealers, and group homes. These
businesses can find it difficult or even impossible to relocate because
the attributes that made them unattractive to the bureaucrats who
changed the zoning rules in the first place are also unattractive to bu-
reaucrats in other areas. Thus, for many businesses, amortization cre-
ates a significant and irreversible impairment of rights.
Put together, these factors suggest that many uses of amortization
violate Texas’s prohibition on retroactive civil laws. Moreover, be-
cause this prohibition involves a balancing test, the government could
78. Robinson, 335 S.W.3d at 150.
79. City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972); see also Brown
v. Town of Corinth, 515 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1974, no writ)
(“[A]n individual’s loss of business, standing alone, does not constitute a constitu-
tional ‘taking’ of property which gives rise to any right to receive compensation from
the sovereign.”); see State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 826 (Alaska 1976) (holding that a
business loss was compensable under the “damaging” provision of the Alaska Consti-
tution and that “[t]o deny compensation for such damages would contravene the pol-
icy behind the constitutional provision, that the condemnee should not pay a higher
price for a public improvement than do other members of the public”).
80. Consumer Serv. All. of Tex., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 433 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 806 (citing Smith v. Decker, 312 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1958)).
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conceivably still amortize businesses that are associated with harmful
secondary effects, like strip clubs, or properties that cause environ-
mental problems. In such cases the governmental interest may be suf-
ficiently strong to overcome the presumption against retroactive laws.
In situations where the government has weaker interests—such as
wanting to produce more tax revenue or to redevelop an area for aes-
thetic purposes—the property owner would have a much stronger ar-
gument. At the very least, a harmless business that is not a nuisance
and does not produce harmful secondary effects will be far more se-
cure than it is now.
2. Amortization Violates Substantive Due Process Because it is
Retroactive
Even if the Texas Constitution’s explicit ban on retroactive laws did
not exist, amortization would still be on shaky legal ground because it
is inherently unfair. Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law “in
accordance with fundamental notions of justice that have been recog-
nized throughout history.”82 As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted,
“[r]etroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are
more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it
can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled
transactions.”83
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, five members of the Supreme Court
specifically viewed retroactive legislation as a problem of due process,
not as an issue that raises takings concerns.84 In that case, the plaintiff
challenged a federal law that established a mechanism for funding
health care benefits for coal industry retirees and their dependents.85
Under the law, the government assigned Eastern the obligation to pay
premiums for workers who had worked for the company prior to
1966.86 Eastern sued, claiming that the law was a taking and that it
violated substantive due process.87 A plurality of the Court held that
the law was a taking and declined to reach the issue of whether the
statute violated substantive due process.88 In particular, the plurality
held that the legislation was unconstitutional as a taking because “it
imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that
could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability
is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience.”89 To
reach this conclusion, the plurality applied the Penn Central balancing
82. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532 (1998) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
83. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992).
84. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 524 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 498–99.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 537–38.
89. Id. at 528–29.
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test—a regulatory takings analysis—without explicitly labeling it as
such.90
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment and argued that East-
ern’s claims were better analyzed under the Due Process Clause. Spe-
cifically, Justice Kennedy argued “the Government ought not to have
the capacity to give itself immunity from a takings claim by the device
of requiring the transfer of property from one private owner directly
to another” (a description that aptly summarizes many uses of amorti-
zation).91 Noting that the constitutionality of the statute turned on the
legitimacy of the governmental action, “the more appropriate consti-
tutional analysis arises under general due process principles rather
than under the Takings Clause.”92 Applying those principles, Justice
Kennedy stated that, while the Court has typically been deferential to
laws affecting economic interests in due process cases, “the Court has
given careful consideration to due process challenges to legislation
with retroactive effects.”93 After listing numerous cases, Justice Ken-
nedy concluded,
If retroactive laws change the legal consequences of transactions
long closed, the change can destroy the reasonable certainty and
security which are the very objects of property ownership. As a con-
sequence, due process protection for property must be understood
to incorporate our settled tradition against retroactive laws of great
severity.94
Justice Breyer, writing for Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
agreed with Justice Kennedy that Eastern’s claim was appropriately
analyzed under the Due Process Clause and not the Takings Clause.95
Justice Breyer concluded, “the Due Process Clause can offer protec-
tion against legislation that is unfairly retroactive at least as readily as
the Takings Clause might, for as courts have sometimes suggested, a
law that is fundamentally unfair because of its retroactivity is a law
that is basically arbitrary.”96 Justice Breyer simply thought that the
law was not “fundamentally unfair.”97
Notably for Texas property owners, the Fifth Circuit has since
adopted Justice Kennedy’s approach to the takings-versus-due-pro-
cess question for retroactive laws. In Simi Investment Co. v. Harris
County,98 the Fifth Circuit noted that a majority of Justices on the
Supreme Court found the statute at issue in Eastern to raise due pro-
90. Id. at 532 (discussing the impact on Eastern’s “investment-backed expec-
tations”).
91. Id. at 544 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 545.
93. Id. at 547.
94. Id. at 548–49.
95. Id. at 556–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 556.
97. Id. at 553.
98. 256 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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cess concerns and advised that, “[e]xcept in the rare cases of depriva-
tions of property based on, for example, illegitimate and arbitrary
governmental abuse, vague statutes, or retroactive statutes, the tak-
ings analysis established by the Supreme Court and this circuit should
control constitutional violations involving property rights that have
been infringed by governmental action.”99
Amortization creates a new obligation, imposes new duties, and at-
taches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations
already passed.100 Many property owners subject to amortization es-
tablished and operated businesses in a zoning environment that al-
lowed such a use, only to have their city turn around decades later and
tell them that they will not permit the business to continue at its cur-
rent location. This is primarily a due process violation and a significant
one. Because the ordinance is retroactive, the courts should view it
with “great severity.”101
V. CONCLUSION
In 2009, the people of the state of Texas amended the Texas Consti-
tution to specifically forbid private takings with the passing of Pro-
position 11.102 This amendment also included a provision that “‘public
use’ does not include the taking of property under Subsection (a) of
this section for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of
economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.”103 Notably,
Proposition 11 was a legislatively referred constitutional amend-
ment.104 The proposal passed out of the House by a vote of 144 yeas–0
nays and the Senate by a vote of 30 yeas–1 nay.105 The voters passed it
with 81% in favor and 19% opposed.106 The measure was supported
99. Id. at 323–24.
100. Professor Serkin, a strong proponent of amortization and the uncompensated
destruction of existing uses, has described amortization as “weakly,” as opposed to
“strongly,” retroactive. Serkin, supra note 8, at 1264; “[Strongly retroactive laws]
change a legal status retroactively.” Id. at 1263–64. Amortization is “weakly retroac-
tive,” in that it operates prospectively “but alter[s] the consequences of events that
predated enactment.” Id. at 1264. Nonetheless, even if amortization is “weakly retro-
active,” even a fan of amortization such as Professor Serkin recognizes that such laws
are, in fact, retroactive. Id.
101. See generally E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 549.
102. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a) (“No person’s property shall be taken, dam-
aged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being
made . . . and only if the taking, damage, or destruction is for: (1) the ownership, use,
and enjoyment of the property . . . by: (A) the State, a political subdivision of the
State, or the public at large; or (B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain
under law; or (2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of property.”).
103. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(b).
104. H.R.J. Res. 14, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009).
105. Texas Eminent Domain, Proposition 11 (2009), BALLOTPEDIA, http://bal-
lotpedia.org/Texas_Eminent_Domain,_Proposition_11_(2009) (last visited Mar. 17,
2016).
106. Id.
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by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, House Speaker, and U.S.
Senator Hutchison. The measure was heavily promoted by the Texas
Farm Bureau, which argued that the amendment would protect prop-
erty owners in a state that “takes pride in property ownership.”107 The
National Taxpayers Union similarly argued that the amendment
would protect property owners “from arbitrary or corrupt deals where
governments take private property for business development.”108 The
“no” vote received precisely $0 in contributions in opposition to Pro-
position 11.109
The Texas Supreme Court has also made clear that private property
rights are paramount in Texas. The court stated:
economic dynamism—and more fundamentally—freedom itself—
also demand strong protections for individual property rights.
Locke deemed the preservation of property rights ‘[t]he great and
chief end’ of government, a view this Court echoed almost 300 years
later, calling it ‘one of the most important purposes of government.’
Indeed, our Constitution and laws enshrine landownership as a key-
stone right, rather than one ‘relegated to the status of a poor
relation.’110
For the patient municipality and its developer allies, however, these
restrictions mean nothing. If the municipality can wait out an amorti-
zation period, it can drive existing businesses out of business and force
the property owner to sell to developers who are more in line with a
planner’s “vision.” And the municipality can do all this without having
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Texans’ antipathy for depriving private entity A of their property to bene-
fit private entity B is also reflected in Texas statutes. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 2206.001 (West 2015) (limiting the taking of private property only for “public
use[s]” and mirroring language in TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17).
110. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC, 363
S.W.3d 192, 204 (Tex. 2012) (discussing the reasoning and effect of Proposition 11)
(quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. IX, § 124 (1690);
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)); In that regard, the Texas Supreme Court has been very
vocal in its support of property rights in recent years. See City of Houston v. Carlson,
451 S.W.3d 828, 830–31 (Tex. 2015) (“The right to acquire and maintain private prop-
erty is among our most cherished liberties. As Locke explained, the value of private
property lies not only in its objective utility, but also in any personal investment
therein . . . . This Court, in particular, has long recognized the undisturbed enjoyment
of private property as a foundational liberty, not a contingent privilege.”) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); Kopplow Dev., Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 399 S.W.3d
532, 535 (Tex. 2013) (“We have described the right to own private property as funda-
mental, natural, inherent, inalienable, not derived from the legislature and as preexist-
ing even constitutions. One of the most important purposes of our government is to
protect private property rights. The Texas Constitution resolves the tension between
private property rights and the government’s ability to take private property by re-
quiring takings to be for public use, with the government paying the landowner just
compensation.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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to pay a single dime in compensation to the property owner.111 Thus,
even though the Texas Constitution; the peoples’ recent amendment
of that constitution to protect private property rights; Texas statutes;
and Texas Supreme Court holdings strongly suggest that a government
policy that drives private entity A out of business so that his or her
property can be acquired on the cheap by private entity B is not fur-
thering a legitimate governmental interest, so long as the municipality
accomplishes this task using amortization, it need not worry that the
courts or the law will stop it.
If Texans are serious about these principles, amortization must end
in this state. Cities should stop using it; the Texas Legislature and the
Governor should strip municipalities of the power to employ it; and,
most importantly, Texas courts should recognize that it is unconstitu-
tional and inequitable. In that regard, it has been decades since the
courts in Texas and beyond have revisited the assumptions and con-
clusions upon which the cases upholding amortization relied. In light
of the revolution in property rights jurisprudence that has occurred in
recent decades, the time is ripe for Texas courts to undertake a serious
constitutional examination of this practice and conclude that it vio-
lates a number of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Texas Consti-
tution. Until this is done, unfortunately, Proposition 11 and proud
proclamations about the supremacy of property rights in Texas
amount to little more than words on paper. If property owners are to
be secure in their places of business, then amortization must come to
an end.
111. Critics have rightly called amortization “simply a compensation-avoidance
scheme.” HUD’s Legislative Guidebook: Its Potential Impact on Property Rights and
Small Businesses, Including Minority-Owned Businesses: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 29 (2002)
(statement of R. James Claus, Ph.D., Principal, Claus Consulting).
